

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
ANDERSON/GREENWOOD DIVISION

Kenneth Green a/k/a Kenneth Bernard Green,	)	C/A No. 8:13-cv-02065-JMC-JDA
	)	
	)	
Petitioner,	)	
	)	
v.	)	<b><u>REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION</u></b>
	)	<b><u>OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE</u></b>
Warden Robert Stevenson III,	)	
	)	
Respondent.	)	
	)	

This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by Respondent. [Doc. 15.] Petitioner, proceeding pro se, is a state prisoner who seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review post-trial petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.

Petitioner filed this Petition for writ of habeas corpus on July 24, 2013.<sup>1</sup> [Doc. 1.] On October 4, 2013, Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment and a return and memorandum to the Petition. [Docs. 15, 16.] On October 7, 2013, the Court filed an Order pursuant to *Roseboro v. Garrison*, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Petitioner of the summary judgment procedure and of the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. [Doc. 17.] On December 3, 2013, Petitioner filed a response in opposition to Respondent's motion. [Doc. 22.]

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<sup>1</sup> A prisoner's pleading is considered filed at the moment it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the court. See *Houston v. Lack*, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988). Accordingly, this action was filed on July 24, 2013. [Doc. 1-3 at 1 (envelope stamped as received by the prison mail room on July 24, 2013).]

Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the record in this case, the Court recommends Respondent's motion for summary judgment be granted and the Petition be denied.

### **BACKGROUND**

Petitioner is presently confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections at Broad River Correctional Institution pursuant to orders of commitment of the Orangeburg County Clerk of Court. [Doc. 1.] In September 2009, Petitioner was indicted for murder. [App. 130–31.<sup>2</sup>] On September 10, 2009, represented by Doug Mellard ("Mellard"), Petitioner pled guilty to the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter and received a sentence of twenty-three years imprisonment. [App. 1–17.]

### **Direct Appeal**

Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal. [Doc. 16-3.] On October 15, 2009, the South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for failure to establish any preserved issues for appellate review pursuant to Rule 203(d)(B)(iv), SCACR. [Doc. 16-5.] Remittitur was issued on November 3, 2009. [Doc. 16-6.] Petitioner submitted a letter to the Court of Appeals in January 2010 [Doc. 16-7], and the Acting Clerk responded, informing Petitioner that the Court of Appeals no longer had jurisdiction over his case [Doc. 16-8].

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<sup>2</sup>The Appendix can be found at Docket Entry Numbers 16-1 through 16-2.

## PCR Proceedings

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed an application for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) on February 5, 2010. [Doc. 16-9.] Petitioner raised the following ground for relief, quoted substantially verbatim:

(a) Ineffective assistance of counsel

[*Id.* at 3.] Petitioner then filed an amendment to his PCR application, alleging the following facts in support of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim:

Counsel rendered ineffective assistance by “failing” to inform Applicant that the law(s) of South Carolina recognize(s) the right of every person to “defend” themselves from death or serious bodily harm, § 16-11-420(E). Further, § 16-11-450(A), grant(s) “immunity” from criminal prosecution to person’s who use deadly force as permitted by the provision(s) of the Protection of Person(s) and Property Act.

[App. 21.] The State filed a return on May 5, 2010. [App. 22–25.]

An evidentiary hearing was held on September 6, 2010, at which Petitioner was represented by W. Scott Palmer (“Palmer”). [App. 26–114.] On February 15, 2011, the PCR court issued an order denying and dismissing the PCR application with prejudice.<sup>3</sup> [App. 123–27.]

A notice of appeal was timely filed. On September 30, 2011, Robert M. Pachak (“Pachak”) of the South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense filed on Petitioner’s

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<sup>3</sup>The PCR court addressed two ineffective assistance of counsel claims: 1) that counsel rendered inadequate advice regarding self-defense and 2) that counsel failed to discuss with petitioner a SLED report analyzing a 9mm bullet taken from the deceased. [App. 123–27.]

behalf a *Johnson* petition<sup>4</sup> for writ of certiorari in the South Carolina Supreme Court. [Doc. 16-12.] The petition asserted the following as the sole issue presented:

Whether defense counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate the SLED ballistic report in his case?

[*Id.* at 3.] At the same time he filed the *Johnson* petition, Pachak submitted a petition to be relieved as counsel. [*Id.* at 7.] Petitioner did not file a pro se response to the *Johnson* petition. The court denied the petition and granted counsel's request to withdraw on July 16, 2013 [Doc. 16-13] and remitted the matter to the lower court on August 13, 2013 [Doc. 16-14].

### **Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus**

Petitioner filed this Petition for writ of habeas corpus on July 24, 2013. [Doc. 1.] Petitioner raises the following ground for relief, quoted substantially verbatim, in his Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254:

**GROUND ONE:** Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of Plea Counsel when counsel failed to investigate the SLED ballistic report before advising Petitioner to enter a plea of guilty, thus Petitioner's plea was involuntary, and the State Courts erred in failing to find counsel ineffective.

[Doc. 1-1 at 3.] As stated, on October 4, 2013, Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 15.] On December 3, 2013, Petitioner filed a response in opposition. [Doc. 22.] Accordingly, the motion is ripe for review.

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<sup>4</sup>A *Johnson* petition is the state PCR appeal analogue to an *Anders* brief; a brief filed pursuant to *Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), effectively concedes the appeal lacks a meritorious claim. See *Johnson v. State*, 364 S.E.2d 201 (S.C. 1988).

## **APPLICABLE LAW**

### **Liberal Construction of Pro Se Petition**

Petitioner brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); *Loe v. Armistead*, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); *Gordon v. Leeke*, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. *Haines*, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, the pro se petition is still subject to summary dismissal. *Id.* at 520–21. The mandated liberal construction means only that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the petitioner could prevail, it should do so. *Barnett v. Hargett*, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the petitioner’s legal arguments for him. *Small v. Endicott*, 998 F.2d 411, 417–18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” *Beaudett v. City of Hampton*, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

### **Summary Judgment Standard**

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:

The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such

that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. *Id.* at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. *United States v. Diebold, Inc.*, 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).

The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. *Id.* at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. *Id.* Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. *Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite Corp.*, 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985), *overruled on other grounds*, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 248. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:

A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only),

admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;  
or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.

## **Habeas Corpus**

### ***Generally***

Because Petitioner filed the Petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), review of his claims is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended. *Lindh v. Murphy*, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); *Breard v. Pruett*, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998). Under the AEDPA, federal courts may not grant habeas corpus relief unless the underlying state adjudication

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” *Williams v. Taylor*, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision,” and “even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” *Harrington v. Richter*, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011). Moreover, state court factual determinations are presumed to be correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

### ***Procedural Bar***

Federal law establishes this Court’s jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This statute permits relief when a person “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States” and requires that a petitioner present his claim to the state’s highest court with authority to decide the issue before the federal court will consider the claim. *Id.* The separate but related theories of exhaustion and procedural bypass operate to require a habeas petitioner to first submit his claims for relief to the state courts. A habeas corpus petition filed in this Court before the petitioner has appropriately exhausted available state-court remedies or has otherwise bypassed seeking relief in the state courts will be dismissed absent unusual circumstances detailed below.

### ***Exhaustion***

Section 2254 contains the requirement of exhausting state-court remedies and provides as follows:

- (b) (1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that—
  - (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or



(B) (i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or

(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.

(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.

(3) A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.

(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.

28 U.S.C. § 2254. The statute requires that, before seeking habeas corpus relief, the petitioner first must exhaust his state court remedies. *Id.* § 2254(b)(1)(A). “To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a habeas petitioner must present his claims to the state’s highest court.” *Matthews v. Evatt*, 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997). Thus, a federal court may consider only those issues that have been properly presented to the highest state courts with jurisdiction to decide them.

In South Carolina, a person in custody has two primary means of attacking the validity of his conviction: (1) through a direct appeal, or (2) by filing an application for PCR. State law requires that all grounds for relief be stated in the direct appeal or PCR application. S.C. App. Ct. R. 203; S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-90; *Blakeley v. Rabon*, 221 S.E.2d 767, 770 (S.C. 1976). If the PCR court fails to address a claim as required by S.C.

Code Ann. § 17-27-80, counsel for the applicant must make a motion to alter or amend the judgment. S.C. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Failure to do so will result in the application of a procedural bar to that claim by the South Carolina Supreme Court. *Marlar v. State*, 653 S.E.2d 266 (S.C. 2007).<sup>5</sup> Further, strict time deadlines govern direct appeal and the filing of a PCR application in the South Carolina courts. For direct appeal, a notice of appeal must be filed and served on all respondents within ten days after the sentence is imposed or after receiving written notice of entry of the order or judgment. S.C. App. Ct. R. 203(b)(2), (d)(1)(B). A PCR application must be filed within one year of judgment, or if there is an appeal, within one year of the appellate court decision. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-45.

If any avenue of state relief is still available, the petitioner must proceed through the state courts before requesting a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts. *Richardson v. Turner*, 716 F.2d 1059, 1062 (4th Cir. 1983); *Patterson v. Leeke*, 556 F.2d 1168 (4th Cir. 1977). Therefore, in a federal petition for habeas relief, a petitioner may present only those issues that were presented to the South Carolina Supreme Court through direct appeal or through an appeal from the denial of a PCR application, regardless of whether the Supreme Court actually reached the merits of the claim.

#### *Procedural Bypass*

Procedural bypass, sometimes referred to as procedural bar or procedural default, is the doctrine applied when a petitioner seeks habeas corpus relief based on an issue he

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<sup>5</sup>In *Bostick v. Stevenson*, 589 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2009), the Fourth Circuit found that, prior to the Supreme Court of South Carolina's November 5, 2007 decision in *Marlar*, South Carolina courts had not uniformly and strictly enforced the failure to file a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) as a procedural bar. 589 F.3d at 162–65. Accordingly, for matters in which there was a PCR ruling prior to November 5, 2007, the Court will not consider any failure to raise issues pursuant to Rule 59(e) to effect a procedural bar.

failed to raise at the appropriate time in state court, removing any further means of bringing that issue before the state courts. In such a situation, the petitioner has bypassed his state remedies and, as such, is procedurally barred from raising the issue in his federal habeas petition. See *Smith v. Murray*, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has stated that the procedural bypass of a constitutional claim in earlier state proceedings forecloses consideration by the federal courts. See *id.* Bypass can occur at any level of the state proceedings if a state has procedural rules that bar its courts from considering claims not raised in a timely fashion. *Id.*

The Supreme Court of South Carolina will refuse to consider claims raised in a second appeal that could have been raised at an earlier time. See S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-90; *Aice v. State*, 409 S.E.2d 392, 394 (S.C. 1991). Further, if a prisoner has failed to file a direct appeal or a PCR application and the deadlines for filing have passed, he is barred from proceeding in state court. S.C. App. Ct. R. 203(d)(3), 243. If the state courts have applied a procedural bar to a claim because of an earlier default in the state courts, the federal court honors that bar. See *Reed v. Ross*, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984); see also *Kornahrens v. Evatt*, 66 F.3d 1350, 1357 (4th Cir. 1995). As the United States Supreme Court explained:

. . . [State procedural rules promote] not only the accuracy and efficiency of judicial decisions, but also the finality of those decisions, by forcing the defendant to litigate all of his claims together, as quickly after trial as the docket will allow, and while the attention of the appellate court is focused on his case.

*Reed*, 468 U.S. at 10–11.

However, if a federal habeas petitioner can show both (1) “‘cause’ for noncompliance with the state rule” and (2) “‘actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation[.]’” the federal court may consider the claim. *Smith*, 477 U.S. at 533 (quoting *Wainwright v. Sykes*, 433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977)). When a petitioner has failed to comply with state procedural requirements and cannot make the required showing of cause and prejudice, the federal courts generally decline to hear the claim. *Murray v. Carrier*, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). Further, if the petitioner does not raise cause and prejudice, the court need not consider the defaulted claim. See *Kornahrens*, 66 F.3d at 1363.

If a federal habeas petitioner has failed to raise a claim in state court and is precluded by state rules from returning to state court to raise the issue, he has procedurally bypassed his opportunity for relief in the state courts and in federal court. *Coleman v. Thompson*, 501 U.S. 722, 731–32 (1991). Absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice, a federal court is barred from considering the claim. *Wainwright*, 433 U.S. at 87. In such an instance, the exhaustion requirement is technically met, and the rules of procedural bar apply. *Teague v. Lane*, 489 U.S. 288, 297–98 (1989); *Matthews*, 105 F.3d at 915 (citing *Coleman*, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1; *Teague*, 489 U.S. at 297–98; *George v. Angelone*, 100 F.3d 353, 363 (4th Cir. 1996); *Bassette v. Thompson*, 915 F.2d 932, 937 (4th Cir. 1990)).

#### *Cause and Actual Prejudice*

Because the requirement of exhaustion is not jurisdictional, this Court may consider claims that have not been presented to the South Carolina Supreme Court in limited circumstances—where a petitioner shows sufficient cause for failure to raise the claim and actual prejudice resulting from the failure, *Coleman*, 501 U.S. at 750, or where a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” has occurred, *Carrier*, 477 U.S. at 495–96. A petitioner may prove cause if he can demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel relating to the default, show an external factor hindered compliance with the state procedural rule, or demonstrate the novelty of a particular claim, where the novelty of the constitutional claim is such that its legal basis is not reasonably available to the petitioner’s counsel. *Id.* at 487–89; *Reed*, 468 U.S. at 16. Absent a showing of “cause,” the court is not required to consider “actual prejudice.” *Turner v. Jabe*, 58 F.3d 924, 931 (4th Cir. 1995). However, if a petitioner demonstrates sufficient cause, he must also show actual prejudice to excuse a default. *Carrier*, 477 U.S. at 492. To show actual prejudice, the petitioner must demonstrate more than plain error. *Engle v. Isaac*, 456 U.S. 107, 134–35 (1982).

### **DISCUSSION**

Petitioner argues defense counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate a SLED ballistic report before advising Petitioner to enter a plea of guilty, rendering Petitioner’s plea involuntary. [Doc. 1-1 at 3.] Respondent argues the claim is without merit. [Doc. 16.] The Court agrees with Respondent.

Under the AEDPA, a federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the underlying state court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts before the court, *id.* § 2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has held the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application of” clauses present two different avenues for relief. *Williams*, 529 U.S. at 405 (“The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit properly accorded both the ‘contrary to’ and ‘unreasonable application’ clauses

independent meaning.”). The Court stated there are two instances when a state court decision will be contrary to Supreme Court precedent:

A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to our clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases. . . . A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court’s clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent.

*Id.* at 405–06. On the other hand, a state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent when the decision “correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case.” *Id.* at 407–08; see also *Richter*, 131 S. Ct. at 786 (“Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court. . . . It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.”). Finally, a decision cannot be contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent unless applicable Supreme Court precedent exists; without applicable Supreme Court precedent, there is no habeas relief for petitioners. *Virsnieks v. Smith*, 521 F.3d 707, 716 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing *Lockhart v. Chandler*, 446 F.3d 721, 724 (7th Cir. 2006); *Simpson v. Battaglia*, 458 F.3d 585, 597 (7th Cir. 2006)); see *Bustos v. White*, 521 F.3d 321, 325 (4th Cir. 2008).

When evaluating a habeas petition based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, assuming the state court applied the correct legal standard—the Supreme Court’s

holdings in *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)—“[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court's application of the *Strickland* standard was unreasonable. This is different from asking whether defense counsel's performance fell below *Strickland*'s standard.”<sup>6</sup> *Richter*, 131 S.Ct. at 785. “A state court must be granted a deference and latitude that are not in operation when the case involves review under the *Strickland* standard itself.” *Id.*; see also *Yarborough v. Gentry*, 540 U.S. 1, 6 (2003) (stating judicial review of counsel's performance is “doubly deferential when it is conducted through the lens of federal habeas”). Even if a state court decision questionably constitutes an unreasonable application of federal law, the “state court's determination that a claim lacks

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<sup>6</sup>In *Strickland v. Washington*, the United States Supreme Court established that to challenge a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a prisoner must prove two elements: (1) his counsel was deficient in his representation and (2) he was prejudiced as a result. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To satisfy the first prong, a prisoner must show that “counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” *Id.* at 688. To satisfy the second prong, a prisoner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” *Id.* at 692. The Court cautioned that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential,” and “[b]ecause of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” *Id.* at 689.

In the specific context of a guilty plea, to satisfy the prejudice prong of *Strickland*, a prisoner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the prisoner] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” *Hill v. Lockhart*, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). The Supreme Court further explained,

In many guilty plea cases, the “prejudice” inquiry will closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing ineffective-assistance challenges to convictions obtained through a trial. For example, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination whether the error “prejudiced” the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial. . . . As we explained in *Strickland v. Washington*, *supra*, these predictions of the outcome at a possible trial, where necessary, should be made objectively, without regard for the “idiosyncrasies of the particular decisionmaker.” *Id.*, 466 U.S., at 695, 104 S.Ct., at 2068.

*Hill*, 474 U.S. at 59–60.

merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” *Richter*, 131 S.Ct. at 786 (quoting *Yarborough v. Alvarado*, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Thus, in such situations, the habeas court must determine whether it is possible for fairminded jurists to disagree that the arguments or theories supporting the state court’s decision are inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. *Id.*

Here, the PCR court evaluated Mellard’s performance under the standards set forth in *Strickland* and *Hill*. [App. 124–28.] The PCR court found,

Applicant further asserts that Counsel erred in failing to discuss with him a SLED report analyzing a 9mm bullet taken from the deceased. (Applicant’s Exhibit 1.) Per the report, the bullet was not matched to any particular weapon. The weapon that fired the fatal shot was not located. Applicant states that he could use the report to argue that the bullet was not proven to match his 9mm, so maybe there was someone other than himself firing a 9mm weapon.

Counsel stated that the solicitor had an open file policy. Counsel stated that he did not have a copy of the report in his file at PCR hearing<sup>7</sup> and did not provide the report to the Applicant. Counsel opined that while he could have attempted such an argument, the argument would not be an effective one. Counsel noted that the physical and testimonial evidence pointed to two shooters, one firing a .40 caliber weapon and one firing a 9mm weapon. In Counsel’s opinion, the report would not make a difference in his assessment of the case. Notably, even in the new version of events presented in Applicant’s PCR testimony, Applicant pointed to the array of 9mm shells recovered at the scene as indicative of his path away from other shooters purportedly located where the .40 caliber shells were recovered, and no other 9mm shells were located.

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<sup>7</sup>The Court notes this reference to the PCR hearing must be a scrivener’s error because a review of Mellard’s testimony at the PCR hearing indicates he testified he did not have a copy of the report in his file at the *plea* hearing. [App. 109–10.]



Based on the foregoing, I find that Counsel's failure to discuss such an argument with Applicant not unreasonable. Further, Applicant has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the SLED report would have impacted his decision to plead guilty. Plea negotiations inherently involve the prediction of a defendant's prospects at trial. Applicant faced grave consequences if convicted of murder, consequences he feared. Based on observation of the Applicant and consideration of the underlying facts and evidence as discussed above, I find Applicant's claim that he would have proceeded with trial had he known of the report to lack credibility. As Counsel noted, the argument Applicant proposes to make would not be effective in light of the other evidence. Therefore, Applicant has failed to satisfy his burden in this regard.

[App. 127–28 (footnote added.)]

The PCR court's denial of Petitioner's ineffective assistance claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of applicable Supreme Court precedent. First, the PCR court applied the *Strickland* and *Hill* standards, which are the applicable Supreme Court precedents. Second, the record fails to demonstrate the PCR court confronted a set of facts that were materially indistinguishable from those considered in a decision of the Supreme Court but arrived at a result different from the Supreme Court precedent. Thus, the Court concludes the PCR court's decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of applicable Supreme Court precedent.

Further, the record supports the PCR court's decision, which demonstrates the PCR court's decision was not an unreasonable application of *Strickland* or *Hill*. The ballistics report was inconclusive regarding whether the bullet was fired from Petitioner's .9mm. [App. 115.] Moreover, in response to questioning by the plea judge, Petitioner stated that he understood his rights: (1) to grand jury presentment; (2) to remain silent; and (3) to a jury trial. [App. 3–5.] He also swore that he understood that, at a trial, the State would

have to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, trial counsel could cross-examine government witnesses and call witnesses on Petitioner's behalf, and he would be presumed innocent. [App. 4–5.]

Petitioner indicated that he was twenty-one years old, he had completed the twelfth grade and obtained his GED, and he had never been treated for mental illness or the abuse of alcohol or drugs. [App. 6.] He further denied having taken any drugs, alcohol, medication, or anything else that would have kept him from understanding the proceedings in the twenty-four hours before his plea. [App. 6.] Petitioner confirmed that Mellard had explained the charges against Petitioner, the possible punishment, Petitioner's constitutional rights, and the State's evidence. [App. 8.] Petitioner swore that he understood he was giving up his rights, that wanted to plead guilty, and that he did not want a jury trial. [App. 7.] After the plea judge read the facts alleged in the indictment, Petitioner again swore that he wanted to plead guilty. [App. 8–9.] Finally, Petitioner assured the plea judge that no one had made him any promises or threats to induce his plea, apart from the sentencing recommendation that the State had placed on the record, that he was satisfied with his attorney, that he had understood the plea judge's questions, and that he had answered them truthfully. [App. 9.] As the PCR court found, Petitioner has failed to establish that he would not have pled guilty had he known about the ballistics report, given that the ballistics report was inconclusive. Therefore, Petitioner has not established that the PCR court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of applicable Supreme Court precedent, and Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, Respondent's motion for summary judgment should be granted.

**CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION**

Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Respondent's motion for summary judgment be GRANTED and the Petition be DENIED.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

s/Jacquelyn D. Austin  
United States Magistrate Judge

July 30, 2014  
Greenville, South Carolina